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Much recent academic study of contemporary capitalism in South Africa has concentrated 
on the relations between different sectors of capital, and on the nature of the South 
African state. In general, the state has been assumed to act in the interests of 
capitalists as a class but to reflect the relative dominance of particular sections of 
capital at different points in time. It has been accepted that different white 
political parties express the aspirations of different sections of capital, and that 
the electoral success of particular parties has resulted both in and from changes in 
the power of some sections of capital relative to others. No detailed studies have 
been made, however, of the relationships between the policies of political parties 
and the interests of associated sectors of capital. McEachern, in a brief paper 
published recently (l), highlights a similar gap in work published on British 
capitalism. For the South African ruling class, parJ.iamentary party competition plays 
a far less important part than in Britain, in the process of policy formulation and 
the resolution of intra-class conflict. None the less, an understanding of the 
relationships between white political parties and capital, and of the role of the 
South African parliamentary system in the perpetuation of exploitation, is essential 
to an understanding of the system of social relations as a whole. In this paper an 
atteq-t is made to reach a preliminary understanding of %he relationships between one 
white political party and capital in the context of wider changes in the system of 
social relations. It is hoped that this will be merely the first step on the path to 
a better understanding of the overall role of the parliamentary system and of 
parliamentary parties in South Africa, and hence of capitalism in that country, 
1948-1960: the Formation of the Progressive Party 
In 1948 Smutsts United Party, securely in power since its formation in 1934, 
was ousted by an Afrikaner nationalist alliance organized around the National Party. 
The United Party, formed at the height of the dominance of the ideology of South 
Africanism, was symbolic of the unity of capital at that time. By 1948, however, it 
had become the party of advanced capital - of manufacturing, mining ancl finance 
capital. (2) Throughout its existence it was a party wracked with dissent and 
conflicting interests. These arose out of 
the difficulty of reconciling nationalism and imperialism, 
to use Hofmeyrts own terminology (3), 
these being the respective ideologies of the two parties involved in fusion, Hertzozts 
National Party and Smutsts South African Party. Conflicts also emanated more directly 
from differences among the various sectors of capital whose interests the party 
sought to represent. Increasingly these cane to be expressed as conflicts between 
conservatives and liberals within the party. By 1948 contradictions in South African 
capitalism had led to a crisis. (4) The United Party found itself unable to act, 
caught in a stalemate of the conflicting interests of its constituents. Faced by a 
determined challenge from the black working class, they were unable to meet it with 
consistent policies of either conciliation or repression. 
1 The Hational Party was openly anti-British, anti-imperialist and anti- 
English-speaking white South Africans. While no longer avowedly anti-capitalist, it 
had been closely associated with Pirowls national socialist New Order Party. The 
experience of having the reins of government snatched by a party apparently hostile 
l to its interests was highly unsettling to the majority of the capitalist class. To it, the National Party and those it represented (the majority of the white working 
class, agricultural capital and an incipient Afrikaner bourgeoisie and petty 
bourgeoisie) seemed to present a far more immediate threat than a black working class 
still led by a staunchly pro-capitalist and democratic black petty bourgeoisie. 
Accordingly they mobilized their resources in support of the Torch Commando, 
a nationwide protest movement set up to defend civil liberties (including such 
franchise rights as existed for black people) and ensure a United Party victory in 
1953. (5) That victory was never forthcoming, but as the nineteen fifties progressed 
it became apparent that, far from constituting a real threat, the National Party was 
actually creating the conditions for rapid economic growth and high profits. Instead 
of launching the expected attack on mining capital, the National Party used the state 
to mount a determined assault on the black working class and petty bourgeoisie, 
legitimizing this through an ideology of racism. The effect of the heightened 
exploitation of the black working class was to provide the surplus value necessary for 
rapid accumulation by the emerging Afrikaner industrial and finance bourgeoisie. (6) 
The National Party consolidated and increased its support amongst the white electorate 
not only by providing the conditions for rapid accumulation but also through 
redistribution of part of this surplus to farmers Land Bank loans, guaranteed ~rices) 
and the white working class and petty bourgeoisie I jobs, artificially high wages). 
Mining capital, during the nineteen fifties, was increasingly diversifying into 
manufacturing (investing excess ~rofits) and thus itself benefited from the hot-house 
conditions provided to industry, as well as from the continuing low wages and high 
labour content associated with the gold mines. (7) 
Increased class conflict expressed as growing confrontation with black 
workers was contained by resorting to massive oppression. More ancl more repressive 
legislation was passed to legitimate this. At the same time pstarbeiters flooded 
in from neighbouring countries to work on the mines, and thus made possible the 
creation of a reserve anay of labour for industry. Finally, the state moved to smash 
black political and working class organizations completely. Tk9-S culminated in the 
massive trials of the late nineteen fifties and early sixties, in the massacres at 
Sharpeville and Langa, in the banning of the ANC and. the PAC, and in the destruction 
of the SACW unions. 
1960-1970: the Party in the Boom Years 
In the ten years before the re-emergence of significant working class 
opposition, South Africa experienced an almost continuous boom. From 1946 to 1957 
GDP increased at 5.1 per cent per annum. From 1957 to 1961 it dropped to 3.2 per cent, 
as a result of the 1957 international recession and of the crisis of confidence 
following Sharpeville. From 1961 to 1969 GDP grew at an average of 6.5 per cent per 
annum. (8) The -10 American Corporation, Anglo-Transvaal, Union Corporation and 
JCI all began diversifying during the nineteen £if-ties. In 1960 Anglo American's 
industrial portfolio was valued at £30 million. By 1969, its industrial interests 
were worth £143 million. (9) At the same time substantial interpenetrations occurred 
between sectors of capital and between Afrikaans ard English owned enterprises. By 
the end of the nineteen sixties, the growth of monopoly capital had been so rapid that 
it was economically dominant in South Africa. (10) During the period until 1970, the 
National Party was returned with increased parliamentary majorities at each general 
election. Support for the Party increased despite a continuous process of erosion of 
traditional civil liberties and freedoms for white people as well as black people. A 
marked change in the dominant ideology occurred among both white electors and capital 
as the racist ideology of the ruling party received increasing credence. Within the 
United Party, continuing ideological strife led to the purge of the progressives in 
1959 by the right, as the party strove to regain power by adopting a political stance 
more and more similar to that of the Xational Party. (11) As both electors and capital 
gave increasing support to the ruling party, however, the material support of the 
United Party was gradually eroded. While it fared badly during the nineteen sixties, 
the Progressive Party did even worse. As proponents of liberal ideology, they found 
themselves more and more isolated. Iiaving performed creditably in Provincial Council 
elections in Natal in 1959, in the general election of 1961 they polled 69,042 votes, 
8.5 per cent of the total, but won only one seat, Boughton. (12) In 1966, their share 
of the poll dropped to 41,065, only 3.5 per cent of the 3otal. Again, Houghton was 
the only seat won. (13) Although in 1964 they had convincingly won the two Cape 
Coloured provincial seats from the United Party, they were at the low point of their 
popularity among the white electorate. The survival of the party over this period 
can probably be attributed to two things - the performance of their sole parliamentary 
representative, I-Ielen Suzman, and the support of the person who, evidence suggests, 
was their sole major -financial backer, EIarry Oppenheimer. (14) In 1968 the Government 
passed the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, effectively depriving the party 
of its electoral support among the Coloured people. 
In 1966 C. W. Eglin was elected Chairman of the party's National Executive 
Committee. I-Ie and Dr Z. J. de Beer together formulated a new strategy for the party. 
They decided that efforts should be concentrated on those groups and constituencies 
where support for the party had been shown to be strongest. They therefore concentrated 
on businessmen and youth, and on six constituencies, and directed party efforts 
accordingly. (15) Despite the new strategy the party did only marginally better in 
1970, in its share of the vote. Contesting nineteen seats (compared with twenty seven 
in 1966) (16) they received 3.5 per cent of the vote (17), but improved their position 
in the six picked seats. Eglin lost Seapoint by 231 votes. Suzman almost trebled 
her majority. (18) In 1974, however, the party won five of the six seats, and won a 
sixth which was not one of those chosen. Later that year, A. Boraine won the 
Pinelands by-election to give a seventh seat. They received 6.4 per cent of the vote, 
having contested twenty-two seats. (19) 
A United Opposition and the Collapse of the United Party: 
Early in 1975, the so-called "Young !Turks" were forced out of the United 
Party and formed the Reform Party in February of that year. On 26 July 1975 the 
Progressive and Reform Parties merged and became the South African Progressive Reform 
Party. Despite strong personal animosities, which delayed the merger, the new group, 
with Eglin as leader, two Senators, eleven MPS and twelve MPCs, proved a viable 
party. (20) Following the merger they were able to capitalize on their image as a 
Party uniting white opposition, as opposed to the United Party which continued to be 
plagued by internal dissension. (21) In May 1976 the United Party lost another 
supposedly safe seat to the Progressive Reform Party in a by-election. In mid-1976, 
de Villiers Graaff, United Party leader, finally acted to stop the rot in his party. 
Stressing the need for fundamental changes in white attitudes, he called for a united 
opposf$ion cutting across party lines. On 5 October, his hand was forced when a 
meeting of l1 leading businessmen and academics" met behind closed doors in Johannesburg 
and subsequently issued a statement reading: 
The meeting decided that in view of the seriousness of 
times and the urgent necessity of bringing pressures to 
bear on the Government to accept more realistic and 
enlightened policies, an appeal would be made to the 
leaders of the United Party, the Progressive Reform 
Party, and the Democratic Party to co-operate to 
establish a steering committee to examine the 
feasibility of creating a new (political) party which 
would be a real alternative government. (22) 
The crisis of the nineteen seventies had demonstrated that the apartheid state was 
not an impregnable monolith, and as doubts arose as to the long-term efficacy of 
repression, a desperate search began for an alternative route of accommodation. In 
1975, only the Anglo American Corporation had applied pressure for a union of the 
opposition Reform and Progressive Parties. (23) By 1976, pressure for a "united 
oppositionff was coming from a far wider spectrum. 
Within a month of the call, the parties set up a committee chaired by ex- 
Ossewabrandwag member and retired judge, J. F. "Kowie" Marais. After two months of 
deliberation, the Committee laid out fourteen principles for a united opposition. 
Following initial agreement, subsequent differences arose as to interpretation of the 
principles. Six right-wing United Party MPS broke away to form the South African 
Party, six others together with Kowie Marais formed the Committee for a United 
Opposition, and the remainder merged with the Democratic Party to form the New 
Republican Party. 
On 5 September 1977, the Committee for a United Opposition and the 
Progressive Reform Party merged on the basis of the Fourteen Principles to form the 
Progressive Federal Party. The new party had eighteen MPS, two Senators and. fifteen 
MPCs. Prime Minister Vorster called a snap election on 30 November 1977, and 
subsequent to that election the Progressive Federal Party became the majority 
opposition party, with seventeen MPS and sixteen MPCs, compared with ten MPS and 
fifteen MPCs for the New Republican Party and three TPs aYld three MPCs for the South 
African Party. The National Party won an extra seventeen seats, to give it 82 per 
cent of the seats in Parliament (134 out of 164 seats). In the three weeks' notice 
before the election the Progressive Federal Party was able to raise R700,OOO and fi&t 
sixty seats. (24) This indicated a very changed situation in comparison with 1966, 
when the Progressive Party had R50,000 to fight twenty-seven seats (25), and 1970, 
when the party had cbastically to curtail expenditure in the middle of the election 
campaign because it had run out of funds. (26) 
The Crisis and Monopoly Capital 
Before examining its policy it is essential to understand the nature of the 
crisis which led to the formation of the new party, and on the basis of which its 
policy was formulated. One effect of the growing importance of manufacturing during 
the nineteen sixties was a trend towards capital intensification (27), and 
consequently a growing reserve a r q  of labour. Unemployment climbed steadily from 
580,000 in 1962 and 750,000 in 1966 to 1,000,000 in 1970. By 1974 it had jumped to 
1,500,000, and as the crisis deepened it grew to l,7OO,OOO in 1975 and 2,000,000 in 
1976. (28) In 1977 it was estimated at 2,300,000, or 22.4 per cent of the labour 
force. (29) Even White, Coloured and Indian unemployment rose 118.7 per cent in that 
year. (30) As unemployment bore more heavily on the working class, opposition grew. 
The renewed class struggle of the nineteen seventies was heralded by a resurgence of 
strikes in 1969. During the nineteen sixties strikes involved, on average, about 
2,000 workers per year. 1969 saw a major dock workers! strike. In 1971 a strike by 
15,000 Ovambo workers paralysed the Namibian econow, aYld 2,000 stevedores went on 
strike in Durban. Strikes built up to a peak in 1973, when 70,000 workers were 
involved. (31) State action against workers and their organizations reduced the 
nwnbers somewhat, but they continued at very high levels. In 1974, 38,961 workers 
went on strike, in 1975 it was 12,451 and in 1976 there were 16,170. Strikes 
continued in 1977 and 1978, but no overall figures are available. (32) Disputes on 
the mines were frequent. In 1974, for instance, there were at least seventeen 
"mine riotsft jn which fifty-one workers were killed, and following which thousands 
were repatriated. (33) 
In 1976 Soweto exploded in a direct challenge to the authority of the state, 
which was unable to restore even a semblance of normality for two years. The South 
African military suffered a severe setback in Angola, and both Angola and Nozambique 
became independent under socialist governments. The liberation wars for Namibia and 
Zimbabwe escalated, as did South Africals increasing international isolation. A 
mandatory arms embargo was imposed, oil became expensive and in short supply, and 
foreign capital began flooding out of the country. The growth rate of the economy 
fluctuated wildly with alternating boom and slump, but averaged only 3.9 per cent of 
GDP over the first half of the decade. In 1976 GDP rose only one per cent (34), and 
GNP actually fell by one per cent. (35) This was aggravated by massive defence 
spending (the military budget trebled between 1970 and 1976), particularly on arms 
purchases, as the state prepared for war. 
Symptomatic of the crisis was a chronic balance of payments problem. 
Current account deficits averaged R838 million in early 1976. With a massive 17.5 
per cent devaluation in 1975, the state began to take steps to control its balance of 
papuents problems. (36) These were compounded, however, by an increasing flight of 
both short-term and long~term capital, following Soweto. In 1977 there was a net 
outflow of short-term capital of R1,086 million. In the first quarter of 1978 this 
climbed to a record R342 million. Rlll million in long~term capital left the country 
in 1977. (37) The situation deteriorated further, and in December 1978 alone foreign 
exchange reserves fell by H210 million, leaving a balance of only R365 million. A 
rising gold price at this time, however, began to cushion the economy. (38) 
Adding to the crisis were political factors. The gold mines rely on foreign 
workers, both as a cheap supply of labour and so as not to reduce the reserve army of 
labour within South Africa and thus force up the price of labour. During the nineteen 
seventies their supplies increasingly were threatened: Malawi halted all recruitment 
following an aeroplane accident in 1974; Lesotho threatened to withdraw its workers 
after a disagreement over the proportion of wages paid direct to it in gold; numbers 
from Mozambique declined, year by year, following the takeover by Frelimo (39) ; 
workers from Angola stopped coming. In 1970, 68.1 per cent of mine workers came from 
outside South Africa. By 1973, it had risen to 75.5 per cent, and 78 per cent in 1974. 
In 1975, following the Malawian ban it declined to 68.8 per cent, to 58.2 per cent 
in 1976, 49.6 per cent in 1977, and in 1978 was 46.7 per cent despite the resumption 
of recruiting in Malawi. (40) Since the gold mines were forced to turn to internal 
supplies of labour at a time when the reserve arqy had reached such huge numbers, the 
problem was not acute, despite the less satisfactory nature of indigenous labour 
owing to seasonal fluctuations , shorter contracts and higher turnover. (41) More 
important, however, was the future outlook should the indigenous reserve anqy decline 
once again. 
The effect of Government measures to control inflation and the balance of 
papnents was to exacerbate the down turn. The index of manufacturing output dropped 
to a four-year low of 112.7 in February 1977. Iscor had to lower production to well 
below 80 per cent of capacity (42) and firms throughout the country indulged in 
labour-force cutbacks. A debate between the director of SEIFSA and the unregistered 
Metal and Allied Workers! Union, however, revealed that at the same time as cutting 
back on numbers of workers firms were forcing others to work overtime. (43) As a 
result of these sorts of tactics, profits, especially for larger enterprises, tended 
to rise during the crisis as its ill effects were passed on to the working class. (44) 
At the same time the crisis had the effect of increasing the rate of centralization 
and interpenetration of capital - the rate of growth of monopoly capital. (45) 
The Dilemma Facing Monopoly Capital 
Monopoly capital, economically dominant in South Africa by the 1970s, had 
particular and distinctive interests which dictated an open economy with strong, 
unrestricted links with the international capitalist world, a stable internal economy 
and social system, ready access to "natural" African markets for investment of surplus 
capital and disposal of surplus commodity production, and therefore a political 
~bccommodation with socialist regimes in Africa. On the contrary, it provided the 
conditions for the rapid emergence of monopoly capital. But the question for monopoly 
capital was that of whether the National Party would, in the future, be a viable 
vehicle for the creation of the conditions dictated by its needs. In contrast to 
the Progressive Party's resoundingly successful tours of African States, Vorsterls 
detente collapsed after a few months. While a working arrangement with Mozambique had 
evolved, Belimo made it clear that it was a temporary and purely pragmatic arrangement 
on its part. In the meantime, the numbers of ANC guerrillas entering South Africa from 
Mozambique rose steadily. While the National Party Government eventually suppressed 
the uprisings of urban African youth, it only did so after great expense and effort, 
and at severe cost to South Africa" international reputation. The Governmentls 
response to international pressure for change had. been threats to retreat to the 
laager. Peace in Namibia and Zimbabwe continued to prove elusive. Moves were being 
made for some sort of accommodation in an attempt to defuse the demands of the African 
working class on unions, and the Government had shown itself prepared to abandon its 
defence of the jobs of the white working class in the mines. (46) But doubts persisted 
as to the ability of the National Party to continue on these lines, in the face of 
right wing opposition within the party (47), and extreme distrust of any Government 
action by black people. 
H. F. Oppenheimer, Chairman of Anglo American until the end of 1978, 
expressed these doubts as follows : 
I think it presents itself, to us [the Anglo American 
corporation] in the first place, but perhaps to business 
in an ever-widening circle, that Nationalist policies 
have made it impossible to make proper use of black 
labour. And ... this is felt to be a danger in two 
ways: a danger because it's necessary in order to get 
the economic growth, to make use of black labour, 
because ... unless you keep the economy extremely small 
you can't man the skilled jobs with white people. And 
on the other hand, it's felt that ... if you are going 
to operate business successfully, you want to do so in a 
peaceful atmosphere, and the only way to have a peaceful 
atmosphere is to enable black people to do better jobs 
and to feel a part of this economic system. And I think 
that it's because the Nationalist policy ... was felt to 
prevent these things happening, that it was looked upon 
as a danger. I would think that most of the business 
world looked on it as a rather long-term danger. 1 think 
probably tended to think of it ... as a rather shorter 
term danger than mmy  of the others did. (48) 
I The problem facing monopoly capital, therefore, was that of finding an alternative 
vehicle able to ensure the protection of their interests in the event of the National 
I Party proving unable to resolve the conflicts threatening capitalism in South Africa. Increasingly, capital had chosen to back the Progressive Federal Party, not instead 
of the National Party (which remained the most powerful representative of organized 
capital in South Africa) but as an alternative, should the Government prove incapable 
l 
, of meeting the challenges facing it. The result was the furth.er polarisation of white 
l 
1 politics in South Africa. The middle ground, occupied by the New Republican Party, 
; was proving increasingly unviable as opinion continued to polarize between the two 
I main white alternatives. The urgency, from the point of view of capital, was that as l 
! time passed options became more and more limited. Capital desperately needed to 
1 resolve the South African crisis before the class realities of the social system 
l became irrevocably the basis of political organization and confrontation. (49) 
The Progressive (~ederal) Party and Capital 
Throughout its existence the Progressive (~ederal) Party has had the image 
of being a party of capital. This arose chiefly out of its links with H. F: Oppenheimer, 
links which had existed since its formation. As was mentioned earlier, there is 
evidence to suggest that for a time during the mid-nineteen sixties he was the party's 
only major financial backer. More recently, however, it seems that these links 
proved more useful for the raising of funds than as a direct source. From 1973 
until 1977, the Party National Treasurer was G. H. Waddell, ex son-in-law to 
H. F. Oppenheimer and an executive director of Anglo American. He is credited with 
having put the party on its feet, financially (although it still pleads relative 
poverty) after years of almost chronic financial crisis. Contributions to the party 
from Oppenheimer in the mid-seventies (no direct financial contributions to the 
party are .made by the corporation) were probably not in excess of R200,OOO per annm, 
whereas in the nineteen fifties the Corporation itself was contributing £250,000 per 
year to United Party coffers. (50) There has been a considerable interchange of top 
personnel between Party and Corporation over the years, including people like Gordon 
Waddell, Zach de Beer, Alex Boraine, Douglas Hoffe and Bobby Godsell. Benefits from 
the association of the party and the Corporation have not accrued to the party alone, 
as Oppenheimer makes clear: 
Outside South Africa, the fact we took - the fact I 
took these views, I think outside South Africa this 
was an advantage to the Anglo American Group. ... I 
mean it was a by-product ... completely a by-product. 
I mean it wasn't done with any such idea in mind. 
But, while it to some extent complicated our 
relationships with the Government, here, it certainly 
improved our image outside. (51) 
Although the strict confidentiality of all donations make it difficult to 
identify donors, it seems likely that there are few big Johannesburg companies which 
have not been approached and made contributions. (52) G. H. Waddell estimated that 
40 per cent of party funds came from "major donorstt and noted that there had been a 
distinct increase in the number of major donors in recent years. He ascribed the 
increased support to their perception of Government policies as real threats to their 
operations. Waddell also claimed that ASSOCOM's latest declaration of principles was 
no different in substance from the principles of the Progressive Federal Party, and 
that promulgations of the interests of its members by the Federated Chamber of 
Industries coincided with Progressive Federal Party policies. (53) 
The Slabbert Committee and Party Policy 
In September 1977, the newly formed Progressive Federal Party appointed a 
f o ~ m a n  committee under the chairmanship of F. van Zyl Slabbert (and including 
Z. de Beer, an executive director of the Anglo American Corporation) to conduct the 
first substantial reformulation of the party's constitutional model for South Africa 
since the Molteno Report of the early nineteen sixties. The terns of reference of 
the Slabbert Committee were the Fourteen Principles of the earlier Kowie Marais 
Committee. The Slabbert Report (54) was adopted at the partyls November 1978 National 
Congress with only minor amendments. Whereas the Molteno Report had not departed from 
the ideological forms and concepts of liberal South Africanism (55), the report of the 
Slabbert Committee exhibited marked differences. The Molteno Report had been couched 
in terms of commitment to the upholding of Western civilization, and the perpetuation 
and extension of white cultural domination. The Slabbert Report, on the other hand, 
addressed directly the problems of capital and adopted novel ideological approaches 
to resolve these. 
In drawing up its report, the Committee took specific cognisance of the need 
to withstand "external and internal attacks" on South Africa, of the need for peaceful 
co-existence of '!all sections of our people", of the situations in Zimbabwe and 
Xmibia, of the new National Party constitutional proposals (56), the formation of the 
South African Black Alliance (SABA - see later), the permanence of urban Africans, the 
ttintensification of Russian and Cuban interest in Southern Africa", the possibility of 
US Congressional support for economic sanctions, and the party's new status as the 
official opposition. Its proposals sought to avoid conflict without thereby creating 
chaos or instability, to avoid domination of any group by any other (and to reassure 
white South Africans of its impossibility under the proposed system), to provide 
representation "for the widest possible spectrum of political interests" and to 
encourage the development "of groups of cross-cutting affiliations that could 
counteract race and ethnic conflicts and antagonismsn. They recommended "a structure 
of government where the resolution of conflict has to be achieved within the political 
process itself" and considered the "institution of a new political dispensation ... a 
matter of urgency if we are to prevent the escalation of the present racial 
confrontation into violent conflict". They specifically excluded, however, all those 
groups advocating "violence" or "subversion" (without defining either of these). (57) 
1 It is clear that the Committee was addressing the problems threatening the 
stability of the capitalist system as a whole, in South Africa, and in doing so were 
attempting to solve the lonpterm problems perceived by the enlightened elements of 
l monopoly capital. Whereas the National Party was sensitive to the needs of capital in the short term, owing to the electoral constraints under which it operated (the 
I constraints imposed by its own ideology of racism) it was unable adequately to treat 
l the long-term problems of social stability. 
I The Slabbert Committee clearly perceived the need for a break with the 
ideologies of the past, both liberal and racist, and the adoption of new ideological 
forms to legitimate monopoly capitalism. In a conscious effort to accommodate black 
disillusionment with capitalism in South Africa, van Zyl Slabbert dropped the 
ideological notion of a "free enterprise econoqy" from the recommendations. He was of 
the view that "free enterprise" would not be an issue within five or six years: 
It is an ideological concept which will become the target 
of aggression for a whole range of black political 
organisations. (58) 
At the same time Slabbert perceived the need to create an ideology of state neutrality 
and separation from capital. The role of the government should be to distribute wealth, 
not to create it, this being the role of business: 
The wealth generators are the economic entrepreneurs; 
the wealth distributors are the political entrepreneurs. (59) 
It is clear that the effect of a successful implementation of such proposals 
would be to defuse class conflict and reconstitute it as conflict between a multiplicity 
of disparate groups. Existing conflict, increasingly expressed at the level of 
produc-tion, would be replaced by conflict at the political and ideological levels, 
generated around issues of distribution. Wealth production would be represented as a 
technical process, distribution as a political one. The state, separated from the 
immediate process of production, would deal with individuals not as members of 
, different classes but as abstract, detached individuals, on the one hand, and as 
I members of a multitude of cultural, religious, regional, ethnic, sexual, economic and 
political groups with "cross-cutting affiliationsf1, on the other. (60) 
1 Inkatha and the Progressive Federal Partx 
l For a successful accommodation of black aspirations it was obviously of 
crucial importance that inter-racial contacts be established and shown to be possible. / To maintain credibility among white voters and capital, the Progressive Federal Party had to show that what they advocated was a viable alternative to apartheid. To show 
this, they had, in turn, to be able to demonstrate their credibility among black South 
Africans. This meant that they had to walk a delicate tight-tope between the varying 
currents of black opinion in South Africa. To a very real extent, having credibility 
with one black gmup meant losing credibility with others. (61) While leaders of the 
party had some contact with radical groups (62), relations were not good on the whole. 
In 1972, the South African Students' Organisation took the following line: 
SAS0 believes that all gmups allegedly working for 
tintegrationf in South Africa ... and here we note in 
particular the Progressive Party and other liberal 
institutions ... are not working for the kind of 
integration that would be acceptable to the black 
m. 'Pheir attempts are directed merely at relaxing 
certain oppressive legislations and to allow blacks 
into a white-type society. (63) 
On the other hand, it was Colin Eglin, shortly after he took over as Party leader, who 
pioneered consultation between white political parties and Homeland leaders. (64) 
Beginning in the early nineteen seventies, the party made it a practice to invite black I 
leaders to its Congresses as observers. No formal links were established with any 
Coloured or Indian political parties, but Dave Curry, Alan Hendrikse and Sonny Leon 
of the Labour Party were all members of the Progressive Party at the time it contested 
Coloured Provincial Council seats in the Cape. Many Natal Indians were members of the l 
Party, before the passage of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act and some l 
Indian businessmen continued to make small contributions to its funds. (65) 1 
R. A. F. Swart, Progressive Federal Party National Chairman, was chief 
architect of their most important contact, that with M. G. Buthelezits Inkatha National 
Cultural Liberation Movement. Swart formed a close friendship with Buthelezi while a 
young United Party MP for Zululand. It was on the basis of this friendship that a 
close relationship was built between Inkatha and the Progressive Federal Party. After 
a meeting between Eglin, Swart, Buthelezi and Dr S. M. Bhengu in August 1978, a joint 
statement was released to the effect that enough common ground existed between the two 
parties to provide the basis of negotiation and agreement on a new constitutional 
framework for South Africa. (66) Contact between the two groups was subsequently 
formalized with the establishment of an "on-going liaison committee with the PFIP and 
Inkatha". (67) Swart stressed that there was a striking degree of coincidence between 
the principles and policies of the two groups. While united in seeking an alternative 
to apartheid, they were also in accord as to the type of alternative they soet. (68) 
This is borne out by comparison of Inkathats Statement of Belief with the details of 
the Slabbert Report. (69) 
Like the Progressive Federal Party, Buthelezi has repeatedly called for a 
National Convention "whiuh should map out our common future as South Africans" (70), 
and expressed Inkatha's commitment to non-violence. In support of his role in the SABA 
(with the Labour Party and the Indian Reform party), he has stressed the need for black 
unity in the face of white oppression. At the same time, however, he has stressed that 
We in Inkatha believe in a multi-strategy approach and 
we cannot therefore treat with disdain any attempts by 
other South Africans black or white aimed at the 
destruction of racism in our land. (71) 
The economic system he envisaged for the future was "An economy based on a 
blend of free enterprise with a pinch of African c~mmunalism~~. (72) In the same speech 
he quoted, with approval, H. F. Oppenheimer as follows: 
To my mind South Africans should strive in every way to 
enable our non-sharing, non-participating majority to 
share in the opportunities and participate in the 
decision-making of the free enterprise system. (73) 
Like the Progressive Federal Party, Inkatha 
rejects the Westminster model of partisan politics. It 
rejects the unfettered capitalism which gives rise to 
oppression by economic elitists. (74) 
Summaxy and Conclusion 
During the boom period of the nineteen sixties the contradictions of South 
African capitalism were obscured. The high rate of growth and low levels of working 
class militancy led to a false sense of security and permanence. Soweto and the crisis 
of the nineteen seventies revealed the conflicts inherent in the system and led to a 
search by elements of capital for alternatives to repression aYrd racism. At the same 
time white politics became increasingly polarized as voters retreated into the laager 
of Afrikaner nationalism or sought clearer alternatives than the confused policies of 
the United Party. This climate led to increased financial and electoral support for 
the Progressive (~ederal) Party from capital and voters, respectively. At the same 
time the party responded to these changes by formulating ideological alternatives to 
meet the needs of capital, on the one hand, and to increase its credibility among 
black people, on the other. In doing so they sought to demonstrate to white voters 
the viability of their alternative policies and to black people the compatibility of 
these with black aspirations. The party thus articulated the needs of a particular 
section of capital, and at the same time attempted to propagate in the society an 
ideological climate conducive to the resolution of some of the conflicts arising out 
of the contradictions. It was National Party inability to meet the challenges posed 
by the crisis that led monopoly capital to turn to a more flexible party. The future 
of the Progressive Federal Party will depend on how effectively the state meets 
challenges from the working class. If it proves unable to contain or conciliate 
working class militancy, capital is likely to twrn increasingly to the ProBgessive 
Federal Party as a preferable bearer of its interests. 
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